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ABSTRACT 
Formal models in political science are increasingly attentive 
to institutional features that ostensibly play a crucial part in 
shaping political outcomes . Propositions yielded by these models have 
proven difficult to test, however. This study has two aims. Its 
substantive objective is to extend the spatial model of legislatures 
to illuminate the mechanisms of influence by committees on 
congressional outcomes. A broader methodological purpose is to 
introduce to political science a new and promising technique for 
testing formal models. Event studies are based on the belief that 
many political outcomes affect the economic welfare of nongovernmental 
actors and that, accordingly, actors with a vested interest in public 
policies respond rationally to changing political expectations. The 
technique is illustrated by testing formally derived propositions 
about the effects of rules and of subjurisdictional choice (the Ways 
and Means Committee's decision about the dimensions of its 
jurisdiction in which to propose legislation) on Congress's 1974 
decision regarding taxation of oil and gas firms . The strong 
empirical results not only support the theory but also offer promising 
implications for continued development and testing of formal models of 
politics and political economy. 
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I. INTR OD UCTION 
Studies of congressional decision-making rarely fail to stress 
the influence of standing committees on congressional outcomes. 
Committe es possess advantag es of information and exp ertise in their 
jurisdictions (Maass, 1983) and are recipi ents of increasing amounts 
of staff and resource support ( Ornstein, et al ., 1985) . Because of 
self-sel ection, committees are often dominated by "preference 
outliers" who use committee resources to obtain outcomes that diverge 
from preferences of most nonoommittee members (Shepsle, 1977) . 
Multistage d ecision-making also facilitates committee influence . 
Committees are initial proposers of legislation, and the parent 
chamber may either defer to committees by refusing to amend their 
bills or may be restricted from offering amendments (Bach, 1981) . 
Committ ee members may be powerful again as penultimate actors in 
conference committe es (MoGown, 1927; Vogler, 1971 ; Shepsle and 
Weingast, 1985) becaus e conference reports typically are unamendable 
(Bach, 1984) . Finally, a select few standing committees receiv e 
special treatment from standing rules of the chamber or from special 
*The comments of Bruce Cain, Rod Kiewiet, Ken Koford, Doug Rivers, 
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rules from the Rules Committe e. For example, legislation of the House 
Ways and Means Committe e is normally protect ed by a restrictive rule 
(Manley, 1970; F enno, 1973), and l egislation of six standing 
committees is giv en privileged status which ensures that it can be 
taken to the floor without a special rule from the Rules Committ ee 
( Oleszek, 1984) .1 
Although the received wisdom about committee influence comes 
primarily from empirical research, in the last decade formal theorists 
too have studied the relationship between committees and congressional 
outcomes. Early attempts to model committee decision-making w er e  
based o n  rather rigid assumptions. Jurisdictions w ere represented as 
single dimensions in a multidimensional choice spac e, and committee 
members were assumed not to incorporate knowledge about rules and 
preferences in the parent chamber into th ei r  first-stage d ecisions 
(Shepsle, 1979) , While the initial results highlight ed the importanc e 
of institutions for generating stable outcom es, the location of the 
equilibria tended if anything to und erstate the degree of committee 
influence.2 Subsequently, several assumptions were relaxed . 
Shepsle's initial model was extended to instanc es in which committe e 
members exercise foresight and receive either open or closed rules for 
their legislation ( Denzau and Mackay, 1983; Krehbiel, 1983) and in 
which jurisdictions may be multidimensional (Shepsle and Weingast, 
1985). In these models, situations may arise in which the equilibria 
are more consistent with casual observations of Congr ess. Each of 
these ext ensions demonstrates the possibility of disproportionate 
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committee influence , and some of them provide general conditions under 
which committee choices determine the outcome. 
Notwithstanding these theoretical developments and related 
casual obse rvations, three forms of skepticism pe rsist among political 
scientists. Some political scientists seem to doubt the effects of 
institutions on outcomes. 3 Many question whether formal models of 
institutions clarify the relationships between institutions and 
outcomes. And most share a belief that tests of these theories exceed 
the bounds of cur rently available empi rical techniques. In the 
narrower context of committees and congres sional outcomes, this study 
add resses skepticism about formal theory by raising two que stions. 
(1) Can formal models offer unique insights into the influence of 
committees on cong ressional outcomes ? (2) Can the models be tested 
using real-world data ? If both questions can be answered convincingly 
and affirmatively, then a broade r joint conclusion is justified. 
Actual political institutions do affect outcomes, and formal theories 
of institutions can be useful in understanding how.· 
Initially a model is proposed that highlights an institutional 
and st rategic basis for committee influence on congressional outcomes. 
The model departs from previous formal theories in two ways. First, 
it extends the spatial model from pure open or pure closed rules to 
modified rules which permit, for example, situations in which a closed 
rule is in effect on some but not all dimensions of a committee's 
jurisdiction.4 Second, it introduces and formalizes a new element of 
committee st rategy, called sub1u risdictional choice (SJC). When a 
standing committee consider s  legi slation, it engages in two kinds of 
activities. The preponderance of attention in previous legi slative 
theory is to the writing (or marking up) of bills on which the parent 
body subse quently acts. A more subtle but equally important feature 
of committee strat.egy st ressed in our model is the committee's choice 
of dimensions in its ju risdiction on which to p ropose change s to the 
status quo. The results f rom the model of rules and SJC comprise our 
attempt to answer question (1). 
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The model alone is not likely to reduce skepticism about the 
empirical relevance of formal models. Therefore, by exploiting the 
fact that congressional outcomes have undeniable and often unambiguous 
effects on the economic welfare of nongovernmental actors, the major 
part of the study addresses question (2). Two theoretically derived 
p ropositions are tested by focusing on the House's consideration of 
energy tax legislation in the 9 3 rd Congress. The political theory is 
imbedded in an expected utility model of economic actors who have a 
vested interest in the taxation of oil and gas companies. This 
permits a natu ral extension to situations in which the type of rule 
under which legislation is considered is not known with certainty, as 
was true in 1974. As rules and SJC affect outcomes so too should 
changes in expectations about rules and SJC affect expectations about 
outcomes. Employing a maintained hypothesis of the rational 
expectations of economic actors, the political theory is tested using 
an event study technique, which is common in the finance and economics 
literatures but unique to political science . In particular, 
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observation of the time series of returns to a portfolio of stocks of 
oil and gas firms permits assessment of whether changing expectations 
about congressional procedure have predictable economic effects. Both 
propositions are supported: rules and SJC affect expectations about 
outcomes as the model predicts. 
Section II introduces the model of the relationship between 
rules , SJC and outcomes and places it in an expected utility framework 
amenable to testing. Section III presents a case that illustrates the 
potential effects of rules and SJC on outcomes. The case facilitates 
a test of joint hypotheses about institutions and outcomes and about 
the relationship between political and economic decision-making. 
Section IV contains the results of the test. Section V is a 
discussion of the implications of the study: Section VI is a brief 
summary. 
II . A MODEL OF RULES AND SJC 
A conventional spatial model of a legislature is employed in 
which it is assumed that a set N of legislators makes collective 
choices from an m-dimensional policy space, X c Rm. Several 
assumptions are made about members ' preferences, strategies and the 
institutional design of the legislature. Each legislator, j e N, has 
a strictly quasi-concave utility function over x e X, Uj (x), with an 
ideal point xj e X .  Members are perfectly informed about other 
members ' utility functions and ideal points , Members' choice of 
alternatives from the policy space is sophisticated given the 
institutional arrangement.5 A committee is a subset of members. A 
jurisdiction is a set of dimensions in the policy space. A committee 
system assigns members to committees, and a jurisdictional system 
assigns dimensions of the policy space to committees. Rules may be 
either closed (no amendments to a committee proposal), modified (only 
previously approved amendments) or open (any germane amendments).6 




the status quo (or reversion) point, 
the bill reported by the committee, 
the ideal point of the median voter on the floor, 
the ideal point of the median voter on the committee, 
the ideal point of the median voter of the majority party, 
an amendment to the committee's bill, 
the set of points preferred or indifferent to x by the jth 
member7, 
closed rule, 
modified rule, and 
open rule. 
Three examples are presented to illustrate the effects of 
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congressional procedure (rules and SJC) on outcomes. The examples are 
stylized either because of theoretical necessity or for clarity of 
exposition. Simplifications not required are the restricted 
dimensionality of the examples and the circularity of indifference 
curves. However, the floor median voter is assumed to be pivotal on 
all dimensions, and the committee is treated as an individual , 
Various arguments have been made to justify anthropomorphizing 
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committees, including: committees are small groups and thus can come 
to agreement on bills even in the absence of a majority rule 
equilibrium; committees have chairmen who in effect are dictators; and 
committee members typically have homogenous preferences. While each 
is lacking in congressional plausibility, two points should be 
stressed. First, there is no known alternative to using an assumption 
such as this for the case of multidimensional jurisdictions. Second, 
the ultimate test should be an empirical one. If the model predicts 
satisfactorily, then it will have been a useful first step in spite of 
the strength of some of its assumptions. 
Rules , Sublurisdictional Choice and Outcomes 
Figure 1 demonstrates theoretically how rules and jurisdiction 
can determine legislative outcomes. Suppose the committee's 
legislation is considered under a CR. Behaving sophisticatedly, the 
committee reports a bill that maximizes the utility of the median 
member of the committee subject to the constraint that 
In this case, xb = xc. Notice, however, that 
the committee's proposal power is undermined by an OR. If amendments 
are permitted on the floor, then the outcome is the floor median, xf 
( Black, 1948, 1958). It is theoretically impossible even for a 
sophisticated committee to preclude xf under an OR. 
The importance of choice of rules is illustrated by cases in 
which alternative members dictate the rule.8 First, if the median 
member of the committee with jurisdiction selects the rule, then a CR 
results. An OR never yields a better outcome for the committee median 
FIGURE I 
Di f f erent Outcomes under Di f f erent Rules and Choosers of Rules 
[ • • •--Rp ( xS)---------------­
[. • •-Rp(xb) ---�-----
Rf(XS) 
Rf (Xb)---l 
C ---Rc <xS) --J 
xa xb 
xP xf xC XS 
Outcome 
under: MR OR CR 
Rule would 
be chosen by: p F c 
member and, as Figure 1 shows, sometimes results in a worse outcome 
than the CR. Second, if the selection of the rule is made by the 
floor median voter, an OR is chosen because it always results in xf. 
Finally, suppose the rule is chosen by the median member of the 
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majority party. The median member of the majority party chooses an MR 
that permits consideration of a utility maximi zing xa such that 
That is, the median member 
of the majority party provides for a vote on an amendment to the 
committee's original proposal that both he and the median voter on the 
floor prefer to the bill and to the status quo. In sum, alternative 
rules and how they are chosen can result in a wide range of outcomes. 
As in the above example, the traditional spatial model of 
legislatures focuses on the committee's dec1sion regarding location of 
its bill, xb. For committees with multidimensional jurisdictions, 
however,' a prior committee decision is the dimensionality of its 
bill--the subset of dimensions in its jurisdiction in which it elects 
to propose changes to the status quo, xs. The committee's decision 
about dimensionality is called subiurisdictional choice (SJC). The 
notation used for SJC accentuates the difference between a committee's 
choice of the subjurisdiction for a bill and its choice of location of 
the bill. When an x contains a superscript, such as x�, it refers 
geometrically to a coordinate on a dimension and substantively to the 
content of the committee's bill. Without a superscript, such as x2, 
the reference is to the entire dimension of policy space, with the 
subscript denoting which dimension. Accordingly, SJC is represented 
by an n-tuple with components xi ( i = 1 ... n) or "• ", where a 
"·" 
denotes the absence of a proposed change on that dimension. For 
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example, a committee with a two-dimensional jurisdiction must make one 
of five SJCs : report no change to the status quo, denoted ( • , • ) ; 
propose a change to the status quo only on the first dimension, 
Cx1, •); propose a change to the status quo only on the second 
dimension, (·,x2); propose separate changes to the status quo on each 
dimension, Cx1,·> and (·,x2); propose changes to the status quo on 
both dimensions at once, Cx1,x2) .
Figure 2 illustrates how a committee can use SJC t o  maintain 
the status quo even given an unfavorable rule. The configuration of 
preferences on the x1 dimension is identical to that in Figure 1. 
- b c With SJC = (x1,•), the committee reports x1 = x1 given a CR. In 
contrast, if an OR or MR amendment is permitted on the x1 dimension, 
the committee's ( weakly) best SJC is (x1,x2), Any bill with an SJC of 
(x1,•) is vulnerable to amendment, such as x
a, for reasons illustrated 
in Figure 1. However, after an SJC of Cx1,x2), the committee 
sophisticatedly locates the bill to ensure its defeat. The committee 
protects against any OR or MR amendment by reporting the bill 
ob ( c e > e x = x1, x2 + a where x2 
points contained in Rf (x
s).
is the highest vertical coordinate of the 
This bill is called an obstructive 
bundle9 because all permissible amendments under the OR or MR on x1 
are outside Rf (x
s) and thus fail if offered, Obstructive bundles 
exemplify the defensive powers of committees via SJC, 
FIGURE 2 
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Figure 3 illustrates how a committee sometimes can use 
sophisticated SJC to increase its utility from the status quo level 
even in the face of an unfavorable rule, The configuration of ideal 
points is identical to Figure 2 except that xf is somewhat right of 
its original position. Notice that a vertical line through xf passes 
through Rc (x
s) .  Under a n  OR or M R  permitting amendments o n  the x1 
dimension and SJC = Cx1,x2), the committee constructs the winning 
bundle xwb = <xf , x�) that has three properties valued by the 
committee. First, like the obstructive bundle, the winning bundle is 
invulnerable to amendments on the dimension on which amendments are 
permitted. Second, it is contained in Rf (x
s) and therefore passes. 
And third, the committee prefers the outcome to the status quo. 
Winning bundles exemplify the offensive powers of committees via SJC, 
These simple illustrations are adequate for testing the 
underlying theory of committee influence , To summarize, the 
theoretical discussion shows that ORs and MRs are not desirable rules 
for a committee with SJC = (x1,·) , But if the committee is afforded 
CR protection on other dimensions in its jurisdiction, then 
sophisticated SJC yields the status quo at worst, and sometimes yields 
a committee-preferred policy. Section III introduces a congressional 
situation that corres ponds closely with this model, 
Expectations of Rules, SJC and Outcomes 
Suppose there is an economic agent outside the legislature 
with preferences over the set of k discrete congressional outcomes 
x 
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income of the agent or the agent's net wealth transfJr .  Assume that 
the various policies are ranked from their highest x1 to their lowest 
xk values for the agent, and that preferences satisfy the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms . Further let n = (n1, • •  ,ni, • .  ,nk) 
represent the agent's subjective probability assessment of the 
outcomes. Given this characteri zation, the agent's expect utility is 
given by 
\ i i v (x,n) = LisK " v (x ), (2.1) 
where Li eK"i = 1. Thus, the agent's expected utility of the policy 
outcomes is conditioned by his expectations over legislative outcomes . 
For instance, if an event makes the agent believe that x1 is more 
likely and xk is less likely to occur, his expected utility changes. 
To quantify the effects of changes in n on v (x,n), totally 
differentiate (2 .1) . Subject to the constraint that Li eKdni 0, 
this yields 
dv (x,n) \ i i Li eK v (x )dn • (2 .2) 
E quation (2.2) is illustrated by two examples on which the 
subsequent empirical tests are based. Assume that there are five 
possible congressional outcomes, xs, x0, x w, xf, and xa, for which 
v (xs) > v (x0) > v (x w) > v (xf) > v (xa), Following the model presented 
above, these outcomes represent the status quo, the committee median, 
the winning bundle under the SJC of Cx1,x2) ,  the floor median, and P's 
amendment under an SJC of Cx1,·>. Suppose the agent is certain that 
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the policy will be considered under a CR with an SJC of (x1,·). Given 
the theory presented above, this implie s that n = (0,1,0,0,0) . Hi s 
expected utility given n is simply v (xc). Next, suppo se that an event 
cause s  him to believe that an MR may be applied to the bill. Hi s 
revi sed probability asse ssment is n = (0,1-p,0,0,p) where 0 < p < 1, 
since he knows that an MR with SJC of (x1,·) yield s x
a, but he i s
uncertain that an MR will be u sed. The change in hi s utility due to 
the change in his expectation regarding the rule i s  equal to 
-v (xc)p + v ( x
a)p = p[v (xa)-v ( xc)] < O. Thus, 
Proposition!: Given the agent' s ranking of the alternative s, the 
relation ship between rules and outcome s, and an SJC of (x1,•), an 
increase in the probability that x� will be considered under an 
MR as opposed to a CR reduces the agent' s expected utility. 
Similarly, suppo se the agent is certain that the bill will be 
con sidered under an MR with an SJC of (x1,·) . In this case, 
n = (0,0,0,0,1) and his expected utility is given by v (xa). Assume 
that the agent' s beliefs change so that there is a possibility that 
the committee' s SJC is (x1, x2). Then his revi sed subjective 
probability estimate is either n (p,0,0,0,1-p) where 0 < p 1 or 
n = (0,0,�,0,1-�) where O < � < 1, depending on the previously 
illustrated relationship between Rf ( x
s) and Rc (x
s). In either case,
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the change in his utility due to thi s altered expectation i s  positive. 
Thus, 
Proposition 1: Under an MR, an increase in the likelihood of an 
SJC of (x1, x2) a s  oppo sed to <x1,•) increase s the e xpected 
utility of the agent. 
Joint consideration of the political model and e xpected 
utility theory has precise implications for the behavior of agent s 
affected by congressional policie s. If the goal of an economic agent 
in an uncertain environment is to maximize his expected utility, then 
change s in expectation s regarding congressional rules and SJC result 
in change s in the agent' s behavior. For example, suppose that x 
represent s the after-tax profit s of a corporation under alternative 
policies and that these profits are highest under xs and lowest under 
xa. The amount an agent would be willing to pay for a claim, such as
stock, on these after-tax profit s clearly depend s on his expectations 
regarding the rules and SJC. Moreover, change s in his e xpectations 
result in change s in the maximum amount he is willing to pay for such 
a claim. These assumption s form the basis for the empirical te st in 
section IV. 
III. ENERGY TAX L E GISLATION IN THE 93rd C ONGRESS
The previous section demonstrates how congressional procedure 
can theoretically affect policy. In this section an actual case i s  
discussed i n  which change s i n  rules and SJC seem t o  have been critical 
determinant s of the legi slative outcome. The ca se is u sed for two 
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reason s. First, while the relation ship between congressional 
in stitutions and outcomes can be demonstrated analytically, few 
illustration s or test s  of these hypothe se s e xi st in the literature. 
Second, while there is little direct support for the hypothe si s that 
in stitution s affect outcome s, there is no direct support for the 
hypothe si s that nonlegi slative actor s who are affected by the policy 
incorporate strategic and in stitutional subtleties into their 
deci sion-making. The case permit s a test of the joint hypothe si s that 
rules and SJC have predictable effects on outcomes and that interested 
economic agent s recognize or can be informed of this relationship and 
sub se quently incorporate it into their decisions, 
Federal Taxation of Oil and Gas Firms10
Oil and gas firm s were subject to many special provisions of 
the federal tax code in 1974 when the second se ssion of the 93rd 
Congress convened. Like all firm s, oil and gas producers were allowed 
to depreciate the cost s of capital investment s and expenditures. But 
unlike most other firm s, oil and gas producer s  could employ one of two 
methods of depreciation. First, they could u se the standard method of 
depreciating a portion of the co st of the assets in each year until 
the original co st equaled accumulated depreciation. This method of 
depreciation was referred to as co st depletion. Alternatively, an oil 
and gas firm could use percentage depletion to recover it s exploration 
and development cost s. Percentage depletion was based on the gross 
income generated from a property subject only to the constraint that 
the total deduction not exceed some fixed percentage of the net income 
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of the property. For instance, suppo se the percentage depletion, also 
called the oil depletion allowance (ODA), was 22% so long as the total 
deduction did not exceed 50% of the net income from the property. If 
the gross income generated by a well was $100,000, the maximum 
deduction for that well was $22,000. If, however, the net income 
(gro ss income minus other deductions) from the well was $40,000, then 
only $20,000 of the deduction was allowed. The total depreciation 
taken on any given property under the percentage depletion was 
unrelated to the co st s of ac quiring the property. Percentage 
depletion, along with expensing of intangible drilling e xpen se s  and 
dry hole s, generated two special and salient features to the federal 
tax treatment of oil and gas production. First, by accelerating 
depreciation, the tax treatment allowed a firm to defer taxe s. 
Second, by increasing total allowable deductions on a given property, 
it reduced a firm' s total tax liability. 
Oil and gas firm s were also affected by some generic features 
of the federal tax code. Firm s earning income from foreign source s 
subject to foreign taxation qualified for equivalent levels of tax 
credit s again st their U.S. tax liabilities. The creditability of 
foreign income taxe s  proved particularly beneficial for U.S., 
multinational oil and gas producing firm s. In 1973, most of the se 
companies had accumulated foreign tax credits (FTC) in e xce ss of their 
U.S. tax liabilities. 
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The Economic and Political Environment of the �3rd Congress11 
In many respects, the time was ripe for changes inimical to 
the interests of gas and oil producing firms. Recent changes in the 
structure of international petroleum markets was a major contributing 
factor. In 1973, the Organization of Oil Exporting Countries ( O P EC) 
restricted production and deliveries. O P EC 's actions increased prices 
for all petroleum products and substitutes to Western and Third World 
countries and led to large increases in profits of the oil industry. 
These so-called windfall profits spawned the ire of many voters and 
congressmen, An attempt to tax windfall profits had failed the 
previous year because of a successful filibuster in the Senate. 
Indeed, the House's reluctance to pass any energy legislation that did 
'not contain a windfall profits tax led to Congress's failure to pass 
any energy bill in the first session. 
Existing criticisms of the oil and gas industry continued in 
the second session of the 93rd Congress. Three distinctive 
provisions, the O DA, the FTC and the expensing of intangible drilling 
e xpenses, again provided a focal point for criticisms of the tax 
treatment of large multinational energy companies. Indeed, it was 
estimated that the ODA and the immediate deductability of intangible 
drilling expenses alone provided the industry with approximately $3.3 
billion in federal subsidies in 1974. Recent studies also called into 
question the notion that these tax breaks were necessary to stimulate 
the development of domestic energy supplies. In short, it was all but 
inevitable that Congress would conduct a thorough and critical 
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examination of oil industry tax policies. 
Jurisdiction over tax legislation in the House belongs 
exclusively to the Ways and Means Committee. Prior to 1974, 
compositional and behavioral changes in the committee were generally 
unfavorable to the interests of oil and gas producers. The minority 
leadership of the committee had become less cooperative with chairman 
Wilbur Mills, a pro-oil representative. The Democratic median on the 
committee had moved in an anti-oil direction in part due to turnover 
following the 1972 elections but more likely due to changes in 
members' preferences brought on by the oil embargo and corresponding 
increasing profits of oil companies. 
In addition to changes within the committee, its relationship 
with the House Democratic leadership changed as a result of reforms 
initiated by the Democratic Caucus in February, 1973. One reform made 
it possible for a Democratic majority to challenge the right of the 
Rules Committee to issue a closed rule for legislation reported by a 
committee. The jurisdiction of the Ways and Means Committee had come 
under scrutiny, also. The net effect of these changes was that the 
authority of the committee chairman and the autonomy of the committee 
itself were being challenged in ways that had not been observed since 
the reforms of 1910. 
Consideration of the Energy Tax Act of 1974 
The Oil and Gas Energy Tax Act of 1974 began its legislative 
journey in the spring in an environment hostile to oil and gas 
industries and to the Democratic leadership of the House Ways and 
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Means Committee. The committee met in early February to begin mark-up 
of the bill. Attempts by the chainnan to construct a bill 
representing the committee's median proved difficult. Conservative 
members of the committee preferred the status quo. They saw little 
advantage to eliminating or reducing the ODA or F TC or to imposing a 
windfall profits tax on oil producing companies, particularly given 
the goal of developing domestic energy production. Liberal members 
demanded immediate elimination of the ODA, imposition of a windfall 
profits tax, and the abolition of F TC. By the end of April, a natural 
compromise emerged which contained a gradual (three year) phase-out of 
the O DA, a limit (52.8) to the percentage of F TC a company could apply 
against its U.S. tax liabilities, and a weakened windfall profits tax 
supported by the Nixon Administration. On May 1, the committee 
reported H.R. 14462 in this state and, as a matter of standard 
procedure, requested a CR for its consideration on the floor. 
Also on May 1, Representative Green, a liberal member of the 
Ways and Means Committee, began collecting signatures in an attempt to 
convene the Democratic Caucus to review the committee's request for a 
CR on H.R. 14462. In particular, his aims were to collect 50 
signatures, to call a Caucus meeting, and to request that the Caucus 
instruct the Rules Committee to write an MR that provided for a 
separate vote on an amendment to repeal the O DA retroactively 
beginning January 1, 1974. Within two days, over half of the 
Democratic members of the House signed the petition. On May 6, 
another liberal member of the committee, Representative Vanik, used 
19 
this same procedure to arrange for consideration an amendment calling 
for the immediate elimination of the F TC. On May 15, the Democratic 
Caucus met and overwhelmingly endorsed both requests. The Rules 
Committee was officially instructed to write an MR for H.R. 14462 that 
would permit debate and votes on these two anti-oil amendments. 
The Ways and Means Committee and its leadership were not 
powerless against the Democratic Caucus, however. The committee's 
chairman first responded by delaying floor consideration and refusing 
to appear before the Rules Committee. Then, on June 6, the chairman 
threatened to exercise his prerogative under House rules to bring the 
privileged bill directly to the floor without a rule. Were this to 
occur, H.R. 14462 would be considered under an OR with all amendments 
meeting standard germaneness requirements in order. It was widely 
believed that consideration under an open rule would effectively kill 
the bill. Liberals and conservatives alike could propose amendments, 
and debate would not be limited. Mills's strategy was perhaps best 
characterized by Rules Committee member Richard Bolling, who said it 
"was like offering a person coming off the desert a drink of water and 
then totally immersing him with a tub" (.Q.Q Almanac, 1974, p. 189).
Many Ways and Means Committee members opposed the OR, too. 
Consequently, the committee met again on June 10 and decided to repeat 
its request for a CR. The House leadership, wishing to avoid a 
potentially destructive party fight, postponed consideration of the 
rule request for energy tax legislation until after the summer recess. 
Thus, in the early part of the summer uncertainty prevailed concerning 
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the rule under which H.R. 14462 would be considered. Relative to the 
spring, however, it was clear that a CR was less likely and an MR more 
likely. 
In the middle of July the Ways and Means Committee met once 
again to consider energy and other pieces of pending tax legislation. 
The outcome of these meetings was the incorporation of H.R. 14462 into 
the general tax reform bill, which was reported out of committee on 
August 2. For two reasons, this strategy was recognized as inimical 
to the liberal interests in the committee and in the House in general. 
First, few members, particularly the House leadership, were interested 
in considering a general (multidimensional) tax bill under an MR .  The 
number of amendments commanding the support of a majority of the 
members of the Democratic Caucus could be qnite large under these 
conditions, and it would be virtually impossible to ensure final 
passage.12 Second, the general tax bill was considered too lengthy 
and complex in its current form for complete consideration and passage 
in the current session, particularly in light of pressing business in 
the Senate.13 Thus, the effect of the July meetings of the Ways and 
Means Committee was to reduce the likelihood that energy tax 
legislation would be considered alone. Indeed, the new expectations 
were that a multidimensional tax bill would be reported. 
As the remainder of 1974 progressed, it became increasingly 
apparent that no tax legislation would be forthcoming from the 2nd 
session of the 93rd Congress. Wilbur Mills, for reasons transcending 
the scope of the current analysis, resigned the chairmanship of the 
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Ways and Means Committee on December 4. The new President was not 
favorably disposed towards general tax legislation. And the Senate, 
which had helped dispose the old President, had little time remaining 
to grapple with the minutiae of tax policy. As of January, 1975, the 
tax treatment of the oil and gas had not changed. Table 1 presents a 
brief chronology of the events concerning energy energy tax 
legislation in the 93rd Congress. 
IV. EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Changes in expectations regarding the legislative procedures 
used to consider energy tax proposals should have altered the 
willingness of agents to pay for residual claims (stocks) to the 
profits of firms in the oil and gas industry. In this section we test 
this hypothesis by examining the relationship between changes in 
prevailing expectations about congressional procedure for H.R. 14462 
and the return to a portfolio of stocks of oil and gas producing 
firms. 
Institutional Expectations for Energy Tax Legislation 
The discussion of H.R. 14462 suggests that there were two 
major events affecting agents' expectations about the institutional 
regime under which energy tax legislation would be considered. Until 
late April, 1974, the prevailing expectation was that H.R. 14462 would 
be considered under a CR like all previous tax legislation originating 
in the Ways and Means Committee from 1932 to 1973.14 Since the bill 
was essentially unidimensional in an anti-oil pro-oil space, the SJC 
TABLE l 
CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS PERTAINING TO ENERGY TAX LEGISLATION 
Nov.-Dec., 1973 
Jan.-Apr., 1974 
May-June, 197 4 
July-Aug., 1974 
Sept.-Dec., 1974 
President Nixon outlines effects of energy 
shortage; proposes legislation. Senate acts 
promptly. House acts slowly due to dispute 
concerning imposition of a windfall profits 
tax. Senate and House cannot agree on 
legislation. No energy legislation passes 
during the 1st session of 93rd Congress. 
93rd Congress reconvenes. Hearings begin on 
taxation of oil industry. Mark-up of Energy 
Tax Act begins. Many anti-oil provisions are 
discussed. Administration proposes a modest 
windfall profits tax. Chairman Mills supports 
gradual phase-out of the ODA. Limitations on 
FTC are proposed. On April 30th, the Oil and 
Gas Energy Tax Act is reported by the Ways and 
Means Committee. The committee formally 
requests a closed rule. 
Green and Vanik petition House Democrats for 
a caucus to review the closed rule request on 
H.R. 14462. Caucus votes to instruct the 
rules committee to write a modified closed 
rule permitting amendments to repeal the ODA 
and FTC for oil and,gas firms. Mills delays 
by refusing to appear before the Rules 
Committee. Mills threatens open rule. Ways 
and Means Committee reconvenes and decides to 
request a closed rule again. House leadership 
postpones consideration of H.R. 14462. 
Ways and Means Committee reconvenes and votes 
to combine H.R. 14462 with general tax bill 
with minor modifications. Green and Vanik, 
together with industry supporters, oppose 
action. No further action on tax bill is 
taken. 
No action taken until post-election session. 
In late November, committee reports bundled 
bill, again opposed by liberal members of the 
committee. Chairman Mills appears with 
stripper on Boston stage. New Ways and Means 
Committee Chairman Ullman requests rule for 
H.R. 17488, the bundled tax bill. Rules Committee 
refuses to move bill to House floor. Tax reform 
in the 93rd Congress dies. 
was simply (x1,•). Expectations about the rule were likely to have 
changed throughout early May, however, as petitions were circulated, 
signatures were obtained, and finally, on May 15, the Democratic 
Caucus voted to instruct the Rules Committee to write an MR. 
A second change i n  expectations occurred i n  late July and 
early August. On August 2, the Ways and Means Committee voted to 
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report the substance of H.R. 14462 in the more general tax bill, H.R. 
15 17488, thus implying tax legislation with an SJC of (x1,x2). Since 
committee deliberations occurred throughout the last half of July and 
the committee's activity became public knowledge, expectations were 
probably changing over this entire period. Figure 4 summarizes these 
expectations using the notation introduced in section II. 
Capital Market Reactions to Procedural Expectations 
The capital market reactions of a portfolio of stocks of oil 
and gas firms to changes in procedural expectations for H.R. 14462 are 
measured below. To reiterate, the value of a residual claim to the 
profits of a firm reflects the present value of all estimated future 
profits based on information currently available. The arrival of new 
information with implications for expectations of future profits 
affects the current value of the claim. In particular, because 
alternative procedures yield different levels of post-tax profits, a 
change in the procedural expectations regarding energy tax legislation 
should be reflected in the current value of a portfolio containing 
FIGURE 4 
Prevailing Expectations About Oil and Gas Taxation, 1974 
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stocks of gas and oil producers. 
Assumptions about the capital market and the formation of 
stock prices must be specified to conduct the test. The first 
assumption is that the efficient markets/rational expectations 
hypothesis holds, This hypothesis states that stock prices reflect 
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all available relevant information. An implication of the hypothesis 
is that it is impossible to make profits by trading stocks on the 
basis of available information. That is, if Rit is the return on a 
stock or portfolio of stocks i in period t, <l't-l is the information 
available in period t-1, E (•) is the expectation operator, and 
O. Essentially, this 
hypothesis implies that the effects of new information are reflected 
fully and quickly in stock prices. The empirical evidence supporting 
this hypothesis is substantial (Schwert, 1981). 
The second assumption is that there is a common factor in the 
return to all assets or a portfolio of assets, This common factor is 
the return to a value-weighted portfolio containing all tradeable 
assets. Given this assumption, the return to any given security or 
portfolio of securities is 
(4.1) 
where Rit and eit are defined above, Rmt is the return to a value­
weighted portfolio of all marketable securities, and ai and �i are 
parameters, E quation (4.1), referred to as the market model, yields 
estimates of the return to a stock or portfolio of stocks which 
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control for marketwide variations in the return to all traded assets. 
The market model can be generated under alternative theoretical 
assumptions and has substantial empirical support (Fama, 1976). 
Conditional on the information set, <l>t-l' and the 
contemporaneous return to the market portfolio, equation (4.1) implies 
that the equilibrium expected return to asset i is simply 
for measuring "unexpected" or "abnormal" returns to assets. Abnormal 
returns are the measured parts of Rit unaccounted for by equation 
(4.1) . Given the rational expectations/efficient markets hypothesis, 
abnormal returns result from changes in information relevant for 
determining the future profits of firms in the specified portfolio. 
In the present case, changes in economic agents' expectations 
regarding the rules and SJC for energy tax legislation should result 
in abnormal stock returns. In particular, two predictions are tested. 
Given an SJC of (x1,·) , increases in the likelihood of an MR as 
opposed to a CR should generate negative abnormal returns (Proposition 
1). Given an MR, increases in the likelihood of an SJC of (x1,x2) as 
opposed to <x1,·) should generate positive abnormal returns 
(Proposition 2). Thus, the following e quation is estimated: 
where 
(4.2) 
Hit the weekly return to the equally-weighted portfolio of 
stocks of oil and gas producers listed in Table 2,16 
TABLE 2 




Clark Oil and Refining 
Conoco Oil 






0 K C, Corp. 
Phillips Petroleum 
Reserve Oil and Gas 
Standard Oil of California 





Commonwealth Oil and Refining 








Quaker State Oil 
Shell Oil 
Standard Oil of Indiana 
Sun Oil 
Texaco Oil 
Union Oil of California 
•This list represents all firms in the 2911 and 2912 Standard 
Industrial Classification (SIC) codes for which daily stock return 
data appeared on the Center for Research and Security Prices 
( University of Chicago) for the dates relevant for estimation. 
Rmt = the weekly return to the value-weighted market portfolio 
of all stocks traded on the New York and American Stock 
Exchanges, 
D1t dummy variable equaling one in weeks of increasing 
expectations of an MR for H. R. 14462, given an SJC of 
Cx1,•), and zero is otherwise, 
D2t a dummy variable equaling one in weeks of increasing 
expectations of SJC of Cx1,x2) given an MR, and zero 
otherwise,17 and 
Bit = the error term. 
The hypothesis H � : r1 = r2 = O is tested against the 
alternative A • Hl ' 'Y 1 < O' 'Y2 o. 
0 Rejection of H1 supports the joint 
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hypothesis that rules and SJC affect outcomes and that economic agents 
recognize this relationship and incorporate it in their decisions. 
Additionally, we test H � : -r1 = y2 against H � : -r1 # y2• Rejection 
of H � implies that there is a significant difference between expected 
outcomes under an SJC of Cx1,•) with a CR and an SJC of Cx1,x2) and 
with an MR on x1• 
Estimation 
Table 3 contains the results of OLS estimations of equation 
(4.2) using data for the three year period January 1, 1973 through 
December 31, 1975. The alternative models are designed to detect 
changes in expectations occurring in weeks other than those containing 
the primary event dates of May 15 (the Democratic Caucus vote) and 
TABLE 3 
ESTIMATION OF EQ UATION (4.2) F OR ALTERNATIV E C O DINGS OF D lt AN D D2t
Rit = ai + PiRmt + r1D1t + r2
D2t + Bit' t 1 ... . ,157 
Parameter Estimatesa 
Event /\ /\ /\ /\ Test� of
Interval ai pi 'Y1 Y2 Hl 
( 0) .003 1.06 -.020 .010 .777 
(1.94) (22.03) (1.106) (0.555) 
(-1,1) .003 1.05 -.029 • 020 6.47 .. 
(2.07) (23.01) (2.950) (1.994) 
(-2,1) .003 1.06 -.018 • 018 4.10 .. 
(1.90) (22.78) (2.00) (2.00) 
(-3,1) ,003 1.05 -.016 • 013 3.31 .. 
(1.95) (22.52) (1.98) (1.58) 
(-4,1) .003 1.06 -,013 .010 2.76• 
(1.95) (22.54) (1.83) (1.40) 
aT Statistics reported in parenthesis below parameter estimates 
b Likelihood ratio test statistic is distributed as an F (2,153) 
c Likelihood ratio test statistic is distributed as an F (l,153) 
•Significant at the ten percent level 















August 2 (the Ways and Means Committee vote), There are two reasons 
that changes outside of these two event weeks may have occurred. 
First, in both cases information and evaluations of the primary 
congressional event were published in major newspapers in the week 
subse quent to the event's actual occurrence.18 Thus, we try to 
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capture the effects of these news reports on expectations by including 
in the definitions of D1t and n2t the week following the primary event 
week. Second, changes in expectations regarding procedural regimes 
undoubtedly occurred prior to the actual events. Agents may have 
forecasted the effects of the Democratic Caucus's action on the 
outcome once the procedure was initiated. Similarly, the leaking of 
information by members or staff of the Ways and Means Committee may 
have reached the capital market prior to the formal event. These 
possibilities suggest a need to analyze several types of coding. 
Using May 15 and August 2 as the event dates for D1t and n2t' the 
intervals (0) ,  (-1,1), (-2,1), (-3,1) and (-4,1) are the alternative 
codings. The first number in parentheses indicates the number of 
weeks before the event week and the second represents the number of 
weeks after the event week included in the definitions of D1t and n2t. 
The results in Table 3 illustrate the stability of the model. 
" " 
The estimated parameters of the market model, ai and pi' have the 
correct signs and values and do not change significantly with 
alternative definitions of D1t and n2t. Summary statistics of the 
estimations, such as the R2, are also stable across alternative 
definitions of D1t and Dzt• In general, e quation (4.2) represents a 
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consistent and significant representation of Rit' the weekly return on
the portfolio of oil and gas stocks. 
The values of the parameters of importance for ttf and H� are 
also stable across all estimations of e quation (4.2). 
,. ,. 
r1 and r2 are 
the correct sign for estimates using alternative definitions of D1t 
and D2t. Indeed, the only variation is the change in the statistical 
significance of the parameter estimates as more or fewer weeks are 
included in the definition D1t and n2t. The first estimation, (0), 
illustrates the significance of ignoring public announcements that 
occurred in the week subse quent to the congressional event and the 
possibility of prior leakage of information. 
,. ,. 
Neither y 1 or y 2 are 
significantly different from zero, nor can we reject H� and H�. 
However, the situation changes dramatically as alternative definitions 
are considered. For instance, the (1,1) definition of D1t and n2t
" " 
yields r1 and y2 which individually are significantly different from 
zero and together permit rejection of ttf at a significance level of 
less than .01. With the exception of the estimation where D1t and Dzt 
are defined as (0) , we are always able to reject H� at no higher than 
the .10 level of significance. Notice that H� is never rejected. 
Expected outcomes under the unidimensional SJC with a CR and the 
multidimensional SJC with an MR are not significantly different. 
" " 
The parameter estimates r1 and r2 have straightforward 
interpretations. The average weekly retu�n to Rit over the estimation 
period is .00185, which under continuous compounding implies an 
annualized rate of return of 10.09 percent. According to the 
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estimation where Dlt and D2t are defined by (-2,1), the return to Rit 
exhibits a one time reduction of 7.00 percent around May 15 and a one 
time increase of 7.04 percent around August 2. Thus, in weeks of 
increasing expectations an MR given an SJC = (x1,·>, the annualized 
return to the portfolio of oil and gas producing stocks is 69.38 
percent lower. Similarly, in weeks of increasing expectations of SJC 
of <x1,x2), the annualized return is 70.69 percent higher. Clearly, 
changing expectations regarding congressional procedures for energy 
taxation legislation affected the value of oil and gas producing 
stocks as predicted. 
Finally, Figure 5 is a graph of the accumulated weekly 
abnormal returns, AWARt, to Rit throughout the year 1974. 
for t = 1,. .. ,52 weeks in 1974, AWARt 
= [s�·t (Ris - �is) 
the predicted value of Ris according to the market model. 
That is, 
" . 
where Ris is 
The market 
model is estimated using data from January, 1973 through December, 
" 
1975 and is used to generated Rit for weeks in 1974. As expected, 
changes in AWARt around May 15 and August 2 are evident. 
V. IMPLICATIONS 
Based on analysis of the House's consideration of energy 
taxation in the 93rd Congress, the two questions raised in the 
introduction receive unambiguous affirmative answers. The formal 
model of rules and SJC does offer unique insights into how committees 
influence congressional outcomes, and the predictions derived from the 
model are testable using the event study technique. Broader 
implications are discussed below as they relate to committees and 
29 
congressional outcomes, the relationship between political and 
economic decision-making, and additional uses of event studies for 
testing formal theories of politics and political economy. 
Committees and Congressional Outcomes 
As stressed above, beliefs about the existence of committee 
influence are pervasive in the congressional literature. In light of 
past studies, the strong evidence of influence of the Ways and Means 
Committee on tax policy in 1974 may not be surprising. But the theory 
and test also contribute to an understanding of the mechanisms of 
committee influence and the benefits from incorporating them into a 
formal model. Political scientists have suspected for some time that 
the closed rule accounts for the relatively great power of committees 
whose legislation receives its protection (Manley, 1970; Fenno, 1973), 
But explicit theoretical explanations for the desirability and effects 
of restrictive rules been offered only recently (Krehbiel, 1985), and 
never have they been subjected to tests using congressional data.19 
In contrast, the model presented in section II further illustrates the 
effects of the closed rule and its unanticipated loss. More 
importantly, the test in section IV provides strong support for the 
underlying theory. 
Another insight supported by the empirical analysis is that 
the loss of the closed rule need not immediately and permanently 
undermine the committee's influence. Pro-oil members of the Ways and 
Means Committee were able to use SJC as an effective strategic 
response to the loss, or threatened loss, of their historical 
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i nstitutional advantage of the closed rule. Two mor e general comments 
ca n be offered. First, the pow er of sophisticated S JC is 
theor etically mor e pr evalent than the examples in section II might 
suggest . General and empirically plausible co nditio ns for th e 
exist enc e  of obstructive a nd wi nni ng bundles are deriv ed elsewher e 
( Gilligan and Krehbi el, 1986). Seco nd, the model a nd case suggest 
that neith er i nstitutions nor strategies should be consid ered i n  
isolatio n. In practical politics, strategies (such as SJC) are 
co nditio ned by i nstitutions (such as rules) as w ell as by changes i n  
proc edural regim es (such as the appar ent shift i n  rule-maki ng pow ers 
from the Rules Committee to the Democratic Caucus i n  the mid-70s) . To 
th e degree that th e i ncorporation of these f eatur es in the spatial 
model clarifies these complex r elationships,. formal mod eling may be 
r egarded as a worthwhil e th eor etical endeavor. But if additionally 
th e models yield t estable implicatio ns that subs equently receive 
empirical support, th ey must be r egarded not m erely as thought­
provoking exercises, but as co nvi ncing tools for demonstrati ng how 
i nstitutions affect outcomes. 
Political .(!l!l! Economic D ecision-making 
Although th e primary substantiv e focus of this study was o n  
political decision-making, the empirical results hav e implicatio ns for 
the relationships betw een political a nd eco nomic d ecision-makers or, 
in this cas e, b etw een Co ngr ess a nd markets. In the empirical t est, 
this co nnectio n  was r epresent ed by the maintai ned hypothesis of 
rational exp ectations. Since the findings could not have em erg ed 
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without som e alt er native but unspecified co nnectio n  between political 
and eco nomic decisions, th e maintai ned hypothesis rec eived implicit 
support. Elaboration upon its meani ng i n  th e co nt ext of co ngressional 
politics is ther efor e h elpful. Obviously, the ratio nal exp ectations 
hypothesis does not require that all traders o n  th e N ew York a nd 
Am erica n Stock E xchang es are w ell-versed in th e minutiae of 
congr essional proc edure. Nor is it nec essary to adopt the som ewhat 
less strict i nt erpretation that most eco nomic actors are sophisticated 
with regard to political institutions. All that is necessary is that 
traders r eceive good i nformation about congr essional i nstitutions, 
strategi es, and their implications for outcom es. Little is know about 
th e sources of this i nformation or its path to th e mark etplace. But 
this study suggests that along th e path from initial sources to final 
traders , some actors are i nstitutionally sophisticat ed. Thus, whil e 
the nature of the co nnection b etw een political a nd eco nomic decisions 
is u nclear, its exist enc e  is u ndeniable. 
Other Uses of Event Studies 
The co nnection between political a nd eco nomic decision-making 
not only made the present t est possible but also accentuates 
opportuniti es for additio nal th eor etically motivated empirical 
research. The 1974 cas e is a straightforward illustratio n of the 
event study t echni que for t esti ng formal th eories of legislatur es. I n  
spite o f  the i ncr easing lit eratur e o n  i nstitutions and equilibria, 
empirical tests of the associat ed theori es are rare a nd limit ed. Som e  
encouraging tests hav e been co nduced in no nlegislative setti ngs (Romer 
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and Rosen th al, 1982) or in labor atory legisla tures (Krehbiel, 1986a). 
But tes ts using congressional d ata h ave been limi ted by crude measures 
of ac tors ' preferences (Ferejohn and Krehbiel, 1985), and /or by 
res tric ted applic abili ty to unidimensional si tua tions (Krehbiel, 
1986b). The even t s tudy technique circumven ts these limi tations in 
cases, such as the present one, in which ac tors ' preferences and 
ch anges in procedural expec ta tions can be iden tified unambiguously. 
Al though there may be an elemen t of for tui ty in finding these c ases, 
informa tion on Congress is subs tan tial and thus typically permi ts 
reasonable inferences abou t preferences and ide n tific a tion of key 
congressional even ts. 
Finally, we are confide n t  that the applicability of the 
technique is broader than the presen t  focus pn congressional rules and 
s tra tegies sugges ts. For example, economists interes ted in regula tion 
h ave recently a t temp ted to use event s tudies to measure the effec ts of 
regula tory policies . In a t  leas t two instances (Binder, 1985 ; Rose, 
1985), the resul ts are con trary to those repor ted above : the poli tical 
events iden tified did not have significan t effects on re turns to the 
relevan t por tfolios. Al though this s tudy canno t directly refute these 
findings, i t  does suggest why marke t effects of poli tical decisions 
were minimal in previous s tudies . Proper iden tifica tion of poli tical 
even ts requires specifica tion of a poli tic al model tha t  is a tten tive 
to ins ti tutional de tail and corresponding op timal s trategies. Sub tle 
choices of rules and subjurisdictions can be much more impor tan t than 
conspicuous choices such as commi t tee vo tes on bills, floor vo tes on 
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amendments, conference repor ts, or vo tes on final p assage. 
Alterna tively, changes in congressional ou tcomes may be c aused by 
exogenous events such as Supreme Cour t decisions ( Gilligan, Marshall, 
and Weingas t, 1986) . In shor t, prior failures to measure the effects 
of regula tion may be a ttribu table to inadequa te poli tical theory 
rather than inadequa te empirical techniques. If so, then the s tudy of 
poli tical economy will progress only when poli tical and economic 
theories are sui tably merged. 
VI, CONCL USION 
To illus tr ate an ins ti tu tional and s tra tegic basis of 
commi ttee influence on congressional ou tcomes, the spa tial model of 
legisla tures was ex tended to incorporate modified rules and 
subjurisdic tional choice. Two propositions were derived from the 
theory and tes ted using economic time series da ta during the 9 3rd 
Congress, The predic ted effec ts of rules and SJC on ou tcomes were 
observed, Considered jointly, the theor e tical and empirical analysis 
has two broader implica tions. Firs t and foremost, politic al 
insti tutions affec t poli tical ou tcomes ; formal models can cap ture and 
illumina te these effec ts ; and even t s tudies are s traigh tforward bu t 
overlooked techniques for tes ting formal models. Second, the implici t 
suppor t for the existence of a sys tema tic rela tionship be tween 
poli tical and economic decisions also has promising implica tions for 
the development and tes ting of ins ti tu tionally and s trategically 
enriched theories of poli tical economy. 
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F OOTNOTES 
1. The committees are Sta ndards of Official Co nduct, House 
Administratio n, Rules , Appropriations, Bu dget, a nd Ways a nd 
Means. Legislation of the first three committees typically 
pertains only to internal House ma tters. Legislation of the last 
three, while privileged, nevertheless usually passes through the 
Rules Committee. Appropriations bills often require waivers for 
poi nts of or der ; Bu dget a nd Ways a nd Mea ns Committees typically 
wa nt and receive restrictive rules for major money bills. As the 
case below illustrates, however, the mere ability to bypass the 
Rules Committee ca n be strategically valuable . 
2 .  Shepsle's (1979) model co ntai ns a structure-induce d e quilibrium 
at the i ntersection of floor me dians . Thus, u nder the 
assumptio ns of the model, the existence of "preference outliers " 
on committees has implications only for the location of 
committees' bills, not the location of final legislative 
outcomes. 
3 .  See, for example , the report on the rou ndtable o n  the 
congressional bu dget process at the 198 5 meeti ngs of the America n 
Political Scie nce Association ( Thurber, 198 5) , 
4 .  I n  the unidimensio nal case, our i ncorporation o f  modified rules 
res embles Shepsle a nd Weingast •s (1981) LCRC game. 
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5. Definitions of sophisticated behavior are institutio n-specific. 
6. 
See, for example, Farquharson (1969) for sophisticate d voting o n
binary age ndas, a nd Denzau a nd Mackay (1983) for sophisticate d 
behavior by legislative committees with unidimensional 
juris dictio ns. 
The House's germa ne ness co nstrai nt requires that amendments 
pertain closely to the legislation under consi deratio n, but this 
is the only co nstraint under a n  ope n rule. Modified rules may be 
modified-ope n or modified-close d, but there is no clear 
disti nction between the two. Deschler a nd Brow n (1982), for 
example, refer to "rules ope n i n  part or close d i n  part. " For 
theoretical purposes, the key feature of modifie d rules is that 
permissible ame ndme nts are specifie d in the rule. 
7. If a member is indifferent between two poi nts, he is assumed to 
vote for the last-propose d poi nt. This technical ass umption
permits avoidi ng rather cumbersome notions of epsilo n e quilibria. 
8 ,  The examples are not i ntende d  to be accurate portrayals of choice 
of rules i n  legislatures but rather are abstractions designe d  to 
represe nt the effects of choice of rules o n  outcomes. 
9 ,  The notion of bundling here is similar to Mackay and Weaver's 
(1983) "commodity bundling. " A key difference is that their 
bu ndling implicitly i ncorporates a n  SJC in which commodity levels 
(policies) are altered in all dime nsio ns. 
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10 , The discussion is based on Background Readings on Ene rgy Policy, 
hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, March 1, 1975, 
pp. 353 -4 13. 
1 1. The information in this subsection is extracted from Morrison 
( 1975) and Balz ( 1974). 
12. The theoretical basis for the expectation is the absence of a 
pure ma jority rule equilibrium in a multidimensional choice apace 
(Mc Kelvey, 1976) , 
13. Among other things, the Senate was increasingly occupied with 
Watergate hearings. See Morrison ( 1975) , 
14. During this forty-one year period, the ·only . exception to the 
(closed) rule occurred in 1973 on a noncontroversial extension of 
the interest equalization tax on foreign stocks and debt 
obligations ( HR 3577). In spite of the open rule, the bill 
passed unamended, 35 8-23 , See QQ Almanac, 1973, p.2 19. 
15, The second dimension in the formal model is a composite dimension 
representing all non-oil provisions in the tax code , The actual 
provisions in H .R .  174 88 were numerous, including revision of 
taxation of real estate and political parties, increasing the 
low-income allowance, increasing the standard deduction, 
ad justing withholding tables, and allowing individuals to use 
large capital losses to reduce federal taxes due for previous 
years. See QQ Almanac, 1974, pp . 1 89 -193. 
16. Often securities are not traded regularly on a daily basis. 
37 
Nonaynchronou a trading can cause biases in estimates of 
parameters derived from daily data (Dimaon, 1979) , Additionally, 
there are frequently day -of-the-week effect s in securities 
returns that may also cause biases. The use of weekly returns 
(the geometric accumulation of daily returns over a seven 
calendar day period) minimizes these biases. 
17 . For both event periods, the New York Times Index was surveyed for 
other events that might substantially affect oil and gas firms. 
None were found , 
1 8. See The New York Times Index and The Washington Poat Index , 
19 . Some insights can be obtained from laboratory experiments, 
however. See Eavey and Miller ( 19 84), Isaac and Plott ( 197 8), 
Kormendi and Plott ( 19 82), and Krehbiel ( 19 86a), 
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